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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HOWARD B. ERICKSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT L. POULSEN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 9973 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEThiENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff for Breach of 
\Varranty to recover damages or the purchase price 
paid for a Ponies of America Stallion by the name of 
''Apple Jack" purchased under the Sales Act of Utah, 
upon the Complaint of the Plaintiff alleging among 
other things a Breech of Warranty of fittness for pur-
pose, which Defendant in his Answer denied. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court, sitting without a 
jury from a Judgment for Defendant of no cause of 
action. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint, 
Plaintiff appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the J udginent, and J udg-
ment in Plaintiff's favor as a matter of law . 
STATEMENT' OF FACTS 
This is an action by plaintiff to recover damages 
or the purchase price paid for a P. 0. A. Stallion by the 
name of ''Apple Jack.'' 
The Trial Court' found that the sale to Plaintiff 
was made on the 29th day of May, 1961, and that Plain-
tiff paid the sum of $1500 to Defendant for the stallion, 
and that as a result of the sterlity of the P. 0. A. Stal-
lion, Plaintiff incurred $24 veterinarian expenses and 
$100 a.s expenses for breeding and caring for the horse. 
(Trial Court's Findings, paragraph No. 1, Amendment 
to Findings, dated the 16th day of July, 1963, paragraph 
14.) 
The findings of the Court (twice amended by the 
Court) established that both parties to the sale knew 
prior to the sale that the horse was to be used by Plain-
tiff for breeding purposes. The horse after the sale was 
transported to Hamilton, ~1ontana, the residence of the 
Plaintiff, wliere it was found, by the Plaintiff, to be 
incapable of begetting offspring and was unfit for the 
purposes for which it was purchased by Plaintiff. (Trial 
Court's Amended Findings, dated the 16th day of July, 
1963, Paragraphs No. 10, 11, 12, and 13.) 
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The Court found that while" Apple Jack" was able 
to impregnate one mare prior to the sale, that after the 
sale he was then unable to impregnate Plaintiff's mares. 
The Court was then unable to make any finding as to 
whether the animal was in fact infertile at the time of 
sale. (Trial Court's findings, Paragraph No.15 as amend-
ed on the 16th day of July, 1963.) 
From the Findings of Fact the Court concluded in 
the Court's Conclusions of Law that the Court from the 
evidence could not predicate the finding of alleged un-
fitness at the time of the sale of "Apple Jack" to the 
Plaintiff. The Court further concluded that no rescission 
was attempted within a reasonable time after Plaintiff 
was put on notice as to "Apple Jack's" claimed infer-
tility and that Plaintiff made no offer to deliver the 
stallion in as good or equal condition as it was then re-
ceived by Plaintiff, and that "Apple Jack's" death was 
not caused in any way by resaon of the claim of ''Apple 
Jack's" incapability to impregnate mares. By reason 
thereof, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had no cause 
of action against the Defendant. (Court's Conclusions 
of Law, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4, and paragraph No.5 
as amended on the 16th day of July, 1963.) 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The Trial Court erred in its Conclusion of 
Law X o. 5 as found in the Amended Conclusions of Law 
dated the 16th day of July, 1963. 
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The Finding of Fact, Paragraph No. 10 as amended 
on the 16th day of July, 1963, states that Defendant rep-
resented the stallion as fit and capable of producing off-
spring. That at the time the defendant knew it was the 
intention of Plaintiff to purchase the P. 0. A. Stallion 
for breeding purposes, and that the Plaintiff relied upon 
the representations, knowledge, and integrity of the 
Defendant. (Findings No. 11 and 12.) 
The Finding of Fact, Paragraph No. 13, was amend-
ed on the 16th day of July, 1963, states that the sta1lion 
was incapable of begetting offspring and was unfit for 
the purpose for which it wa3 purchased. 
Taking these Findings of Fact, the Court concluded 
in its Conclusions of Law, that there was not sufficient 
evidence presented by the Plaintiff to find the unfitness 
of the stallion as of the time of sale. 
Other Courts have not had the same troubles. See 
Eden vs. Vloedman, 214 P 2d, 930, where the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, in 1949, held that a seller of cows war-
ranted that the~T were fit for breeding purposes, and im-
mediately after the sale they began to calf prematurely 
because they were infected with banks disease, the war-
ranty was breached even if the defect was not fully de-
veloped at the time of sale, the Court allowing in evidence 
the statement of a veterinary eight months after the sale 
of said cattle that he examined ten head of said cattle, 
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picked at random and found them affected with bangs 
disease. 
In Mousel vs. Widker, 69 NW 2d, 783, the case ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota in 1955, 
where the Trial Court's failure to give certain instruc-
tions on an implied warranty, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court stated, citing other cases, that where an animal 
is purchased for breeding purposes and the seller as 
w~ll as the buyer knew that the animal was purchased for 
breeding purposes, and the purchaser introduced evi-
dence showing sterlity, the general rule pronounced by 
the Courts is that in such sales there is an implied war-
ranty available as a basis for action, that the thing pur-
chased is reasonably suitable for the purpose for which 
it is to be used. In the case of Mousel vs. Widker2 the 
Court cited the case of Peterson vs. Dreher, 194 NW. 53. 
46 Am. Jur., page 573, states that testimony of third 
persons who examine the horse immediately after its 
sale and while in buyer's possession is admissable to 
prove unsoundness at the time of sale, absent any evi-
dence introduced that would tend to show that purchaser 
was in some manner responsible for the sterlity or in-
fertility as the case may be. 
In the case of Studebaker Brothers Co., vs. Ander-
son, 50 rt. 319, 67 P. 663, this Court held that the 
unfitness of an automobile was proved by evidence show-
ing that the automobile was not fit for the purpose when 
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it was in the possession of the purchaser. The case does 
not make note nor consider the question of whether or 
not the car was fit at the time of the sale, but bases its 
decision upon the fitness of the automobile while in the 
possession of the purchaser ... implying that fitness 
at the instant the sale takes place is not a necessary 
requisite to the maintenance of the action. 
(See further in this regard 53 A. L. R. 2d, 844; 77 
C. J. S. 1188; and Balch vs. Newberry, 252 P. 2d, 153, 
Oklamoho, 1953.) 
As a further argument, the Trial Court did not find 
that there was a change in the physical condition of the 
stallion after the sale and before arrival in Hamilton, 
:Montana, where it was found to be unfit by the Plaintiff. 
Absence of such a finding would predicate only one find-
ing: That the stallion must have been in the same con-
dition at the time of the sale, notwithstanding Finding 
of Fact No. 5, and the nebulous No. 9, which were made 
before Plaintiff's motion to amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and should be regarded as amended 
as they are inconsistent with the later Findings of Fact, 
Paragraph 13, and the Judge's Memorandum Decision. 
Point 2. That the Trial Court erred in making Con-
clusions of Law, No. 4, and the Judgment. 
The Conclusions of Law and the Findings of Fact 
are not consistent. The Judgment, although supported 
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by the Concluaions of Law, is not supported by the Find-
ings of Fact. In the case of Mason vs. Mason, 160 P. 2d, 
730, 108, Utah, 428, this Court said as follows: 
''It is fundamental that the Conclusions of Law 
must be predicated and find their support in the 
Findings of Fact, and the Judgment 1nust follow 
the conclusions of Law, and if the Conclusions 
of Law are at variance with the findings, the Su-
preme Court will order the lower court to set 
aside its erroneous conclusions and substitute 
correct ones therefor." 
For further cases see: Parrot Brothers vs. Ogden 
City, 50 Utah, 512, 167 P. 807; and again we find Brittian 
vs Gorman, 42 Utah, 586, 133 P. 370, where this Court 
said: That Conclusions of Law must be based upon the 
facts and must be considered with the facts, and in a 
like fashion the Court's decree must rest upon legal 
conclusions and be consistent with them. A judgment, 
if in conformity with the findings, will not be distributed; 
and of course, the converse is true. A judgment not in 
conformity with the findings cannot be permitted to 
stand. 
In the last above cited case, the Judgment was va-
cated and set aside and the case remanded to the District 
Court with inatructions to make and enter additional 
findings, if necessary, conclusions of law supported by 
the findings, and a decree in harmony with the opinion. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant cites the Mason case supra, 
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the Parrot Brothers Company case supra, and the Brit-
tian case supra, as authority for error in that the judg-
ment in the case at bar denies Plaintiff relief, yet the 
Findings of Fact and the J\iemorandum of the Judge 
clearly states that the Court finds the facts and makes 
the legal conclusions in accordance with Plaintiff's 
theory of the case, except for the fact that the Court 
found Plaintiff delayed in attempting to rescind the con-
tract. 
The second reason, wherein Plaintiff-Appellant al-
leges that the Trial Court erred in making is Conclusions 
of Law, is the fact that the Court denied Plaintiff re-
covery as found in the Judgment and dismissed Plain-
tiff's complaint, apparently predicating its decision upon 
the fact that the Plaintiff did not attempt rescission upon 
a reasonable time after Plaintiff was put on notice of 
"Apple Jack's" infertility. The question is one dealing 
with election of remedies. 
In the case of Balch vs. Newberry, cited supra, upon 
the filing of a complaint by the Plaintiff, the Defendant 
filed a motion to elect demanding that the Plaintiff make 
his election to sue for damages or to sue for the rescis-
sion of the contract. 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff's complaint prays for 
judgment against the Defendant in the amount of $1500, 
being the purchase price of the horse, together with 
various costs expended by Plaintiff. The second para-
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~raph i~ a prayer for rC's('ission of the contract of sale 
for Bn•P<'h of Warranty and for damages stated in the 
l'ir~t paragraph. Plaintiff's prayer is double-barreled in 
the rPsped that it first asks for damages and alternat-
ively asks for rescission. The Defendant did not, as in the 
<·a~P of Balch vs. Newberry, supra, make or file any mo-
tion to compel Plaintiff to elect a remedy. At no time dur-
ing the trial of the matter did the Defendant move for an 
l'h·dion. 'rhe Trial Court apparently based its decision 
upon reseission and did not consider the first paragraph 
of Plaintiff'~ prayer for relief based upon damages for 
Hreerh of "~arrant~·. In this regard, the Trial Court 
erred. S0etion 60-5-7, Ftah Code Annotated, 1953, states 
that when the buyer has claimed and has been granted 
a remed~· in any one of these ways, no other remedy is 
available. At no tilne did the Defendant request Plain-
tiff to elect a remedy, nor was an election made other 
than that found in the pleadings. The judgment of the 
Court does not grant a remedy as it was made upon the 
:1~~mnption that Plaintiff had elected rescission \vhen in 
fact. Plaintiff's first prayer for relief contains a claim 
t'or damages. In the case of !(ramer vs. K:. 0. Lee and 
:--:on~. 237 X'r 166, where the North Dakota Supreme 
Court held that: ''Though Plaintiff failed to rescind 
within time, they are not necessarily shut off from all 
remedy. 1 t is only when they have claimed and have been 
!.!Tnnted the remedy of recission under the provisions of 
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Section 5591A (our Section 60-5-7, Sub 2 ,Utah Code An-
notated, 1953) that this method is exclusive." 
Quoting other cases : 
"It is true that the complaint is based upon re-
scission and asks for the return of the purchase 
price, but the counterclaim is in itself an action 
brought by the Defendants against Plaintiffs and 
the reply must be treated as an answer. In the 
reply the Plaintiff realleges the allegations that 
their signatures were obtained by fraud and de-
ceit, and they asked for relief demanded in the 
complaint; that is, the return of the purchase 
price paid, together with the re-delivery of the 
notes and mortgages. Having failed to show time-
ly recission, Plaintiffs are relegated to their 
right to damages as an offset to suit on the notes 
and mortagages.'' 
So it is in the case that the Plaintiff, assuming that 
he is barred from an action or recission, is not barred 
from bringing an action in damages. See further 78 
C. J. S. 144 where it is stated: 
"It has been held that the buyer must elect be-
tween affirmance and rescission of the contract, 
and that he is bound by his election. But it has 
been held that an unsuccessful suit for the pur-
chase price paid based in a rescission of the con-
tract of sale does not preclude a recovery of dam-
ages, and that a buyer who has waived his right 
to rescind ma~r sue for damages, and that a buyer 
who has waived his claim for damages may re-
scind and reclaim the consideration paid. A buy-
er who elects to affirm the contract and sue for 
damages has the entire period allowed h!' the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
::Statute of Linutat1ona 1n which to institute his 
actwn, out a buyer who elects to rescmd must act 
w1thm a reasonable tnne.'' 
1t 1s, tneretore, realleged. that the '.l'nal Court's 
actwn ill c11~uuss1ng pla1ntllf 's complaint was untimely 
and that t11e '.l'nal Court, although finding .Plainti:it 
delayed too long to cmnmence an action for rescission 
was entitled to receive da1nages Inasinuch as .t>laintiff 
never claiined and had never been granted the remedy 
lf rescission under the provisions of Section 60-5-7, Sub 
~, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The L! tah Supreme Court, in the case of Studebaker 
Brothers Company, vs. Anderson, 50 Utah, 319 P. 663, 
1916, held that the Defendant had the remedy of res-
cission of the contract but that was not the only remedy 
the Defendants could invoke as the vendee had a right 
to rescind the contract and recover back the purchase 
price, or he may retain the article and hold the vendor 
for his damages. The Court cited 28 Cyc. 44. 
POlXT 3. That the Trial Court erred in making Con-
elusion of Law No. 3. 
The firs two points conaidered in this brief consider 
the errors of the Trial Court for failing to grant relief 
to the Plaintiff on grounds not considered by that Court 
or grounds inconsistently decided by that Court. This 
Point concerns itself with the proposition that the Trial 
Court erred in making the dPrision as found in the Judg-
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ment. For this argument only the record of the case ia 
referred to and only that portion of the record dealing 
with the conversations between Plaintiff and his wife 
and the Defendant occuring after the sale. The findings 
of the Court support the other facts considered. The 
conclusion states that Plaintiff did not attempt to rescind 
the contract within a reasonable time, yet the testimony 
indicates the Defendant encouraged the Plaintiff to 
keep the stallion, thereby waiving the provision for res-
cission after a reasonable time. 
Mrs. Erickson, the wife of the Plaintiff, stated that 
soon after the purchase of the horse and upon discovery 
of his infertility, that during the conversation over the 
telephone the defendant said, ''Just wait awhile and give 
the horse a chance to mature since he was just a young 
horse." That Mrs. Ericksen replied that she agreed to 
take the advice of the Defendant. Thereafter, certain 
letters wree written by the Plaintiff notifying Defendant 
of the infertility of the stallion. (Transcript page 54, 
lines 12-18, Transcript page 255.) 
Mr. J\tfereness, a witness for Defendant, testified that 
he, under the direction of the Defendant, took another 
stallion to the Plaintiff's ranch for breeding purposes. 
(Transcript page 193 and Transcript page 205.) 
Doctor Poulsen ad1nitted the fact of the telephone 
call, and stated in his testimony that with time the horse 
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would get maturity and breed. (Transcript page 218, 
line 15.) 
It would appear from the record that there is un-
eontradicted evidence of notification by Plaintiff to 
Defendant soon after the sale on May 29, 1961, and that 
at Defendant's request and advice Plaintiff retained the 
animal, which subsequently died from causes apart from 
hi~ infertility. There is little doubt from the letters in 
evidence as to the question of attempted rescission after 
the death of the horse. 
Section 60-5-7 ( 5) states that: 
'·Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale 
and elects to do so, if the seller refuses to accept 
an offer of the buyer to return the goods, the 
buyer shall thereafter be deemed to hold the 
gooda as bailee ... " 
Sub-paragraph 3 of the same action states th~t 
where the goods have been delivered the buyer cannot 
rescind the contract if he fails to notify the seller within 
a reasonoble time of his election to rescind, or to offer 
to return the goods in substantially the same condition. 
These sub sectiona state that only notification and an 
offer are requisites and not the filing of complaints 
claiming rescission and physical delivery of the property 
to the door of the seller. The evidence shows that there 
wa~ notification and that Defendant requested Plaintiff 
to keep the horse • 'awhile'' and now Defendant main-
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tains that Plaintiff waited too long. The Trial Court 
erred in holding that on unreasonable time had passed. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is urged that the decision of the 
Lower Court be reversed. Directions to enter judgment 
in favor of Plaintiff as prayed for in his complaint, 
firstly for damages and secondly and alternatively for 
rescission of the contract. 
By inference, the Trial Court has barred Plaintiff's 
recovery by way of damages and specifically barred 
Plaintiff' 3 recovery by way of rescission for the Breech 
of Warranty which was error. The Appellant herein does 
not claim both remidies, and realizes that only one remedy 
may be granted. Therefore, Plaintiff asserts to this 
Honorable Court his right for damages as set forth in 
the first paragraph of Plaintiff's prayer, and in the 
alternative for rescission a~ set forth in the second para-
graph of Plaintiff's prayer for relief. 
As a concluding remark, Plaintiff cites to the Court 
the memadandum decision of the Judge, upon which 
the original Findings of Fact should have been pre-
dicated, which states as follows: 
''That Plaintiff cannot recover in this action be-
cause he delayed too long after ascertaining that 
''Apple Jack'' could not impregnate the mare3 
before he attempted to rescind." 
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Again in the memorandum it is said: 
'• Except for the foregoing, the Court finds 
facts and makes legal conclusions in accordance 
with Plaintiff's theory of the case. Findings of 
Fad, Conclusions and a Judgment dismissing 
the action may be prepared because rescission 
wa~ not attempted within a reasonable time after 
Plaintiff was put on notice as to" Apple Jack's" 
infertility.'' 
The thinking of the Trial Court was with the Plain-
tiff and the Findings of Fact as amended reaffirm this 
fact. Cases need not be cited wherein it is stated that 
the Supreme Court will not alter the findings of the 
Trial Court if there is reasonable evidence to support 
the findings. Plaintiff-Appellant does not in any manner 
contest the findings, but reaffrms to this Court as a 
matter of law the Trial Court erred in making its con-
clusions from the Findings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE D. PRESTON 
GEORGEW.PRESTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Appellant 
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